mirror of
https://github.com/dong-nz/cv.git
synced 2026-11-23 00:20:40 +07:00
infra: Basic-auth file leaves the repository (spec-v6 D16) — deploy/htpasswd gitignored, written on the VPS from the HTPASSWD_CONTENT secret; Gitea mirrors brought to full parity (permissions, STACK_DIR/CONTAINER_NAME guards)
This commit is contained in:
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@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
|
|||||||
name: Redeploy Nginx
|
name: Redeploy Nginx
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Infra files only (spec-v4-deploy-infra D1): a change to the nginx template,
|
# Infra files only (spec-v4-deploy-infra D1): a change to the nginx template or
|
||||||
# the compose definition, or the Basic-auth file redeploys the container —
|
# the compose definition redeploys the container — content commits never do.
|
||||||
# content commits never do. workflow_dispatch is the token-rotation runbook.
|
# workflow_dispatch is the token-rotation runbook. The Basic-auth file is no
|
||||||
|
# longer repository content (spec-v6 D16): the HTPASSWD_CONTENT secret carries
|
||||||
|
# it and the job writes it on the server. Mirror of .github/workflows/ —
|
||||||
|
# scheduled for deletion (D9); kept behaviour-identical until then.
|
||||||
on:
|
on:
|
||||||
push:
|
push:
|
||||||
branches:
|
branches:
|
||||||
@@ -10,7 +13,6 @@ on:
|
|||||||
paths:
|
paths:
|
||||||
- nginx.conf
|
- nginx.conf
|
||||||
- compose.yaml
|
- compose.yaml
|
||||||
- deploy/htpasswd
|
|
||||||
workflow_dispatch:
|
workflow_dispatch:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
concurrency:
|
concurrency:
|
||||||
@@ -20,21 +22,60 @@ concurrency:
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|||||||
jobs:
|
jobs:
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||||||
redeploy:
|
redeploy:
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||||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||||
|
permissions:
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||||||
|
contents: read
|
||||||
steps:
|
steps:
|
||||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
||||||
|
# The stack directory and the container name are the server's deployment layout,
|
||||||
|
# not repository content: both come from repository variables (spec-v6 D15), and
|
||||||
|
# STACK_DIR is the same value `deploy.yml` uses. A missing STACK_DIR would rsync
|
||||||
|
# the two infra files into the remote user's home and then run docker in the
|
||||||
|
# wrong place; a CONTAINER_NAME that disagrees with the service this repository
|
||||||
|
# ships would recreate nothing and probe a container that does not exist. Both are
|
||||||
|
# refused here — before any rsync, before anything reaches the server.
|
||||||
|
- name: Check stack variables
|
||||||
|
env:
|
||||||
|
STACK_DIR: ${{ vars.STACK_DIR }}
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||||||
|
CONTAINER_NAME: ${{ vars.CONTAINER_NAME }}
|
||||||
|
run: |
|
||||||
|
case "$STACK_DIR" in
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||||||
|
/*) ;;
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||||||
|
*)
|
||||||
|
echo "::error::STACK_DIR is not an absolute path — add it as a repository variable (Settings → Actions → Secrets and Variables → Variables), value: the Dockge stack directory, e.g. /opt/stacks/dong-site"
|
||||||
|
exit 1
|
||||||
|
;;
|
||||||
|
esac
|
||||||
|
case "$STACK_DIR" in
|
||||||
|
*/)
|
||||||
|
echo "::error::STACK_DIR must not end with / — this job appends the slashes it needs"
|
||||||
|
exit 1
|
||||||
|
;;
|
||||||
|
esac
|
||||||
|
# The name is used twice over: as the compose service to recreate, and as the
|
||||||
|
# docker target of the health probe. compose.yaml — this repository — declares
|
||||||
|
# both, so the variable is checked against the file it has to agree with.
|
||||||
|
if ! grep -qE "^ ${CONTAINER_NAME}:" compose.yaml; then
|
||||||
|
echo "::error::CONTAINER_NAME is not a service in compose.yaml — the recreate step names a compose service, so the two must match"
|
||||||
|
exit 1
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
if ! grep -qF "container_name: ${CONTAINER_NAME}" compose.yaml; then
|
||||||
|
echo "::error::CONTAINER_NAME does not match container_name in compose.yaml — docker exec and docker logs target that name"
|
||||||
|
exit 1
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
echo "Stack: $STACK_DIR, container: $CONTAINER_NAME"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Ship exactly the three triggered files. Never .env, never secrets/ (D6).
|
# Ship exactly the two triggered files. Never .env, never secrets/ (D6).
|
||||||
# The action builds the rsync source as "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/$path" and passes
|
# The action builds the rsync source as "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/$path" and passes
|
||||||
# it as one argument (entrypoint.sh) — so NO --relative: -R mirrors the whole
|
# it as one argument (entrypoint.sh) — so NO --relative: -R mirrors the whole
|
||||||
# absolute workspace path onto the server (run 2026-10-23 created
|
# absolute workspace path onto the server (run 2026-10-23 created
|
||||||
# dong-site/workspace/dong.nguyen/cv/… on the VPS). Plain -avz lands each
|
# dong-site/workspace/dong.nguyen/cv/… on the VPS). Plain -avz lands each
|
||||||
# file's basename in remote_path; the htpasswd step names deploy/ itself.
|
# file's basename in remote_path.
|
||||||
- name: Sync nginx.conf
|
- name: Sync nginx.conf
|
||||||
uses: burnett01/rsync-deployments@v9
|
uses: burnett01/rsync-deployments@v9
|
||||||
with:
|
with:
|
||||||
switches: -avz
|
switches: -avz
|
||||||
path: nginx.conf
|
path: nginx.conf
|
||||||
remote_path: /opt/stacks/dong-site/
|
remote_path: ${{ vars.STACK_DIR }}/
|
||||||
remote_host: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_HOST }}
|
remote_host: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_HOST }}
|
||||||
remote_port: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_PORT }}
|
remote_port: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_PORT }}
|
||||||
remote_user: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_USER }}
|
remote_user: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_USER }}
|
||||||
@@ -44,26 +85,44 @@ jobs:
|
|||||||
with:
|
with:
|
||||||
switches: -avz
|
switches: -avz
|
||||||
path: compose.yaml
|
path: compose.yaml
|
||||||
remote_path: /opt/stacks/dong-site/
|
remote_path: ${{ vars.STACK_DIR }}/
|
||||||
remote_host: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_HOST }}
|
|
||||||
remote_port: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_PORT }}
|
|
||||||
remote_user: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_USER }}
|
|
||||||
remote_key: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY }}
|
|
||||||
- name: Sync deploy/htpasswd
|
|
||||||
uses: burnett01/rsync-deployments@v9
|
|
||||||
with:
|
|
||||||
switches: -avz
|
|
||||||
path: deploy/htpasswd
|
|
||||||
remote_path: /opt/stacks/dong-site/deploy/
|
|
||||||
remote_host: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_HOST }}
|
remote_host: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_HOST }}
|
||||||
remote_port: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_PORT }}
|
remote_port: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_PORT }}
|
||||||
remote_user: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_USER }}
|
remote_user: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_USER }}
|
||||||
remote_key: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY }}
|
remote_key: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY }}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# The Basic-auth file is repository-secret content, not repository content
|
||||||
|
# (spec-v6 D16): the HTPASSWD_CONTENT secret carries the one htpasswd line
|
||||||
|
# (user + bcrypt hash), inlined into a single-quoted shell literal — a
|
||||||
|
# bcrypt hash is riddled with `$` and appleboy's `envs:` mechanism exports
|
||||||
|
# values unquoted, so the remote shell would expand `$2y…` away. Written
|
||||||
|
# BEFORE the test step: nginx -t opens auth_basic_user_file, so its mount
|
||||||
|
# needs a real file. chmod 600 keeps the credential readable only by the
|
||||||
|
# stack owner. Needs the HTPASSWD_CONTENT secret on Gitea too.
|
||||||
|
- name: Write deploy/htpasswd from the secret
|
||||||
|
uses: appleboy/ssh-action@v1.2.0
|
||||||
|
with:
|
||||||
|
host: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_HOST }}
|
||||||
|
port: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_PORT }}
|
||||||
|
username: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_USER }}
|
||||||
|
key: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY }}
|
||||||
|
script: |
|
||||||
|
cd "${{ vars.STACK_DIR }}"
|
||||||
|
HTPASSWD='${{ secrets.HTPASSWD_CONTENT }}'
|
||||||
|
if [ -z "$HTPASSWD" ]; then
|
||||||
|
echo "HTPASSWD_CONTENT is not set as a repository secret — add the output of: htpasswd -nbB <user> '<pass>'" >&2
|
||||||
|
exit 1
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
mkdir -p deploy
|
||||||
|
printf '%s\n' "$HTPASSWD" > deploy/htpasswd
|
||||||
|
chmod 600 deploy/htpasswd
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Test-before-touch (D3): the throwaway container runs the same entrypoint
|
# Test-before-touch (D3): the throwaway container runs the same entrypoint
|
||||||
# render pipeline as production, with placeholder values — nginx -t checks
|
# render pipeline as production, with placeholder values — nginx -t checks
|
||||||
# syntax only, so the real token never enters this container or the job.
|
# syntax only, so the real token never enters this container or the job.
|
||||||
# A failure here fails the job; the live container keeps serving.
|
# A failure here fails the job; the live container keeps serving.
|
||||||
|
# The placeholder must be a resolvable literal IP: a literal hostname in
|
||||||
|
# proxy_pass IS resolved while the config is parsed (spec-v4-deploy-infra §4).
|
||||||
- name: Test new config
|
- name: Test new config
|
||||||
uses: appleboy/ssh-action@v1.2.0
|
uses: appleboy/ssh-action@v1.2.0
|
||||||
with:
|
with:
|
||||||
@@ -72,7 +131,7 @@ jobs:
|
|||||||
username: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_USER }}
|
username: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_USER }}
|
||||||
key: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY }}
|
key: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY }}
|
||||||
script: |
|
script: |
|
||||||
cd /opt/stacks/dong-site
|
cd "${{ vars.STACK_DIR }}"
|
||||||
docker run --rm \
|
docker run --rm \
|
||||||
-v "$PWD/nginx.conf:/etc/nginx/templates/default.conf.template:ro" \
|
-v "$PWD/nginx.conf:/etc/nginx/templates/default.conf.template:ro" \
|
||||||
-v "$PWD/deploy/htpasswd:/etc/nginx/htpasswd:ro" \
|
-v "$PWD/deploy/htpasswd:/etc/nginx/htpasswd:ro" \
|
||||||
@@ -82,7 +141,8 @@ jobs:
|
|||||||
nginx:alpine nginx -t
|
nginx:alpine nginx -t
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Apply + verify (D4): recreate is the same command the Dockge deploy
|
# Apply + verify (D4): recreate is the same command the Dockge deploy
|
||||||
# button runs. The health probe uses wget because nginx:alpine carries no
|
# button runs, with the service/container names from CONTAINER_NAME — already
|
||||||
|
# checked against compose.yaml above. The health probe uses wget because nginx:alpine carries no
|
||||||
# curl; on failure the job prints the container log and fails.
|
# curl; on failure the job prints the container log and fails.
|
||||||
- name: Recreate and probe
|
- name: Recreate and probe
|
||||||
uses: appleboy/ssh-action@v1.2.0
|
uses: appleboy/ssh-action@v1.2.0
|
||||||
@@ -92,11 +152,11 @@ jobs:
|
|||||||
username: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_USER }}
|
username: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_USER }}
|
||||||
key: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY }}
|
key: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY }}
|
||||||
script: |
|
script: |
|
||||||
cd /opt/stacks/dong-site
|
cd "${{ vars.STACK_DIR }}"
|
||||||
docker compose up -d --force-recreate dong-site
|
docker compose up -d --force-recreate "${{ vars.CONTAINER_NAME }}"
|
||||||
sleep 2
|
sleep 2
|
||||||
if ! docker exec dong-site wget -q -O /dev/null http://127.0.0.1/; then
|
if ! docker exec "${{ vars.CONTAINER_NAME }}" wget -q -O /dev/null http://127.0.0.1/; then
|
||||||
docker logs --tail 50 dong-site
|
docker logs --tail 50 "${{ vars.CONTAINER_NAME }}"
|
||||||
exit 1
|
exit 1
|
||||||
fi
|
fi
|
||||||
docker exec dong-site nginx -t
|
docker exec "${{ vars.CONTAINER_NAME }}" nginx -t
|
||||||
@@ -12,9 +12,12 @@ concurrency:
|
|||||||
jobs:
|
jobs:
|
||||||
build:
|
build:
|
||||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||||
# Site identity (spec-v4-deploy-infra D10/D12): the build and the resume
|
permissions:
|
||||||
|
contents: read
|
||||||
|
# Site identity (spec-v4-deploy-infra D10/D12, spec-v6 D3): the build and the resume
|
||||||
# generator derive every published URL and the page title from these two
|
# generator derive every published URL and the page title from these two
|
||||||
# values; the build fails loudly when either is missing.
|
# values; the build fails loudly when either is missing. They are repository
|
||||||
|
# variables — public values, not secrets.
|
||||||
env:
|
env:
|
||||||
SITE_URL: ${{ vars.SITE_URL }}
|
SITE_URL: ${{ vars.SITE_URL }}
|
||||||
SITE_NAME: ${{ vars.SITE_NAME }}
|
SITE_NAME: ${{ vars.SITE_NAME }}
|
||||||
@@ -36,6 +39,8 @@ jobs:
|
|||||||
generate-resume:
|
generate-resume:
|
||||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||||
needs: build
|
needs: build
|
||||||
|
permissions:
|
||||||
|
contents: read
|
||||||
env:
|
env:
|
||||||
SITE_URL: ${{ vars.SITE_URL }}
|
SITE_URL: ${{ vars.SITE_URL }}
|
||||||
SITE_NAME: ${{ vars.SITE_NAME }}
|
SITE_NAME: ${{ vars.SITE_NAME }}
|
||||||
@@ -82,7 +87,32 @@ jobs:
|
|||||||
deploy:
|
deploy:
|
||||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||||
needs: [build, generate-resume]
|
needs: [build, generate-resume]
|
||||||
|
permissions:
|
||||||
|
contents: read
|
||||||
steps:
|
steps:
|
||||||
|
# The stack directory is the server's deployment layout, not repository
|
||||||
|
# content: it comes from the STACK_DIR repository variable (spec-v6 D15). An
|
||||||
|
# empty or malformed value would aim rsync at /dist/ on the remote host, so the
|
||||||
|
# job refuses it here — before any artifact download, before anything reaches the
|
||||||
|
# server — exactly like the site-identity check refuses a missing SITE_URL.
|
||||||
|
- name: Check stack directory
|
||||||
|
env:
|
||||||
|
STACK_DIR: ${{ vars.STACK_DIR }}
|
||||||
|
run: |
|
||||||
|
case "$STACK_DIR" in
|
||||||
|
/*) ;;
|
||||||
|
*)
|
||||||
|
echo "::error::STACK_DIR is not an absolute path — add it as a repository variable (Settings → Actions → Secrets and Variables → Variables), value: the Dockge stack directory, e.g. /opt/stacks/dong-site"
|
||||||
|
exit 1
|
||||||
|
;;
|
||||||
|
esac
|
||||||
|
case "$STACK_DIR" in
|
||||||
|
*/)
|
||||||
|
echo "::error::STACK_DIR must not end with / — this job appends /dist/ itself"
|
||||||
|
exit 1
|
||||||
|
;;
|
||||||
|
esac
|
||||||
|
echo "Deploy target: $STACK_DIR/dist/"
|
||||||
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v8
|
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v8
|
||||||
with:
|
with:
|
||||||
name: static-site
|
name: static-site
|
||||||
@@ -104,7 +134,7 @@ jobs:
|
|||||||
debug: true
|
debug: true
|
||||||
switches: -avzr --delete
|
switches: -avzr --delete
|
||||||
path: dist/
|
path: dist/
|
||||||
remote_path: /opt/stacks/dong-site/dist/
|
remote_path: ${{ vars.STACK_DIR }}/dist/
|
||||||
remote_host: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_HOST }}
|
remote_host: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_HOST }}
|
||||||
remote_port: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_PORT }}
|
remote_port: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_PORT }}
|
||||||
remote_user: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_USER }}
|
remote_user: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_USER }}
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
|
|||||||
name: Redeploy Nginx
|
name: Redeploy Nginx
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Infra files only (spec-v4-deploy-infra D1): a change to the nginx template,
|
# Infra files only (spec-v4-deploy-infra D1): a change to the nginx template or
|
||||||
# the compose definition, or the Basic-auth file redeploys the container —
|
# the compose definition redeploys the container — content commits never do.
|
||||||
# content commits never do. workflow_dispatch is the token-rotation runbook.
|
# workflow_dispatch is the token-rotation runbook. The Basic-auth file is no
|
||||||
|
# longer repository content (spec-v6 D16): the HTPASSWD_CONTENT secret carries
|
||||||
|
# it and the job writes it on the server, so credential rotation is a secret
|
||||||
|
# edit + a dispatch, never a commit.
|
||||||
on:
|
on:
|
||||||
push:
|
push:
|
||||||
branches:
|
branches:
|
||||||
@@ -10,7 +13,6 @@ on:
|
|||||||
paths:
|
paths:
|
||||||
- nginx.conf
|
- nginx.conf
|
||||||
- compose.yaml
|
- compose.yaml
|
||||||
- deploy/htpasswd
|
|
||||||
workflow_dispatch:
|
workflow_dispatch:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
concurrency:
|
concurrency:
|
||||||
@@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ jobs:
|
|||||||
# The stack directory and the container name are the server's deployment layout,
|
# The stack directory and the container name are the server's deployment layout,
|
||||||
# not repository content: both come from repository variables (spec-v6 D15), and
|
# not repository content: both come from repository variables (spec-v6 D15), and
|
||||||
# STACK_DIR is the same value `deploy.yml` uses. A missing STACK_DIR would rsync
|
# STACK_DIR is the same value `deploy.yml` uses. A missing STACK_DIR would rsync
|
||||||
# the three infra files into the remote user's home and then run docker in the
|
# the two infra files into the remote user's home and then run docker in the
|
||||||
# wrong place; a CONTAINER_NAME that disagrees with the service this repository
|
# wrong place; a CONTAINER_NAME that disagrees with the service this repository
|
||||||
# ships would recreate nothing and probe a container that does not exist. Both are
|
# ships would recreate nothing and probe a container that does not exist. Both are
|
||||||
# refused here — before any rsync, before anything reaches the server.
|
# refused here — before any rsync, before anything reaches the server.
|
||||||
@@ -62,12 +64,12 @@ jobs:
|
|||||||
fi
|
fi
|
||||||
echo "Stack: $STACK_DIR, container: $CONTAINER_NAME"
|
echo "Stack: $STACK_DIR, container: $CONTAINER_NAME"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Ship exactly the three triggered files. Never .env, never secrets/ (D6).
|
# Ship exactly the two triggered files. Never .env, never secrets/ (D6).
|
||||||
# The action builds the rsync source as "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/$path" and passes
|
# The action builds the rsync source as "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/$path" and passes
|
||||||
# it as one argument (entrypoint.sh) — so NO --relative: -R mirrors the whole
|
# it as one argument (entrypoint.sh) — so NO --relative: -R mirrors the whole
|
||||||
# absolute workspace path onto the server (run 2026-10-23 created
|
# absolute workspace path onto the server (run 2026-10-23 created
|
||||||
# dong-site/workspace/dong.nguyen/cv/… on the VPS). Plain -avz lands each
|
# dong-site/workspace/dong.nguyen/cv/… on the VPS). Plain -avz lands each
|
||||||
# file's basename in remote_path; the htpasswd step names deploy/ itself.
|
# file's basename in remote_path.
|
||||||
- name: Sync nginx.conf
|
- name: Sync nginx.conf
|
||||||
uses: burnett01/rsync-deployments@v9
|
uses: burnett01/rsync-deployments@v9
|
||||||
with:
|
with:
|
||||||
@@ -88,16 +90,33 @@ jobs:
|
|||||||
remote_port: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_PORT }}
|
remote_port: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_PORT }}
|
||||||
remote_user: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_USER }}
|
remote_user: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_USER }}
|
||||||
remote_key: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY }}
|
remote_key: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY }}
|
||||||
- name: Sync deploy/htpasswd
|
|
||||||
uses: burnett01/rsync-deployments@v9
|
# The Basic-auth file is repository-secret content, not repository content
|
||||||
|
# (spec-v6 D16): the HTPASSWD_CONTENT secret carries the one htpasswd line
|
||||||
|
# (user + bcrypt hash). The secret is inlined into a single-quoted shell
|
||||||
|
# literal — a bcrypt hash is riddled with `$` and appleboy's `envs:`
|
||||||
|
# mechanism exports values unquoted, so the remote shell would expand `$2y…`
|
||||||
|
# away; the htpasswd character set (user name + bcrypt base64) contains no
|
||||||
|
# single quote, so this quoting is exact. Written BEFORE the test step:
|
||||||
|
# nginx -t opens auth_basic_user_file, so its mount needs a real file.
|
||||||
|
# chmod 600 keeps the credential readable only by the stack owner.
|
||||||
|
- name: Write deploy/htpasswd from the secret
|
||||||
|
uses: appleboy/ssh-action@v1.2.0
|
||||||
with:
|
with:
|
||||||
switches: -avz
|
host: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_HOST }}
|
||||||
path: deploy/htpasswd
|
port: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_PORT }}
|
||||||
remote_path: ${{ vars.STACK_DIR }}/deploy/
|
username: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_USER }}
|
||||||
remote_host: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_HOST }}
|
key: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY }}
|
||||||
remote_port: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_PORT }}
|
script: |
|
||||||
remote_user: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_USER }}
|
cd "${{ vars.STACK_DIR }}"
|
||||||
remote_key: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY }}
|
HTPASSWD='${{ secrets.HTPASSWD_CONTENT }}'
|
||||||
|
if [ -z "$HTPASSWD" ]; then
|
||||||
|
echo "HTPASSWD_CONTENT is not set as a repository secret — add the output of: htpasswd -nbB <user> '<pass>'" >&2
|
||||||
|
exit 1
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
mkdir -p deploy
|
||||||
|
printf '%s\n' "$HTPASSWD" > deploy/htpasswd
|
||||||
|
chmod 600 deploy/htpasswd
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Test-before-touch (D3): the throwaway container runs the same entrypoint
|
# Test-before-touch (D3): the throwaway container runs the same entrypoint
|
||||||
# render pipeline as production, with placeholder values — nginx -t checks
|
# render pipeline as production, with placeholder values — nginx -t checks
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -27,8 +27,12 @@ dist-ssr
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
# Deployment/runtime config (spec-v4-deploy-infra D10/D13): the stack's
|
# Deployment/runtime config (spec-v4-deploy-infra D10/D13): the stack's
|
||||||
# secrets/site_config and the local .env carry site identity and the write token.
|
# secrets/site_config and the local .env carry site identity and the write token.
|
||||||
|
# spec-v6 D16: the Basic-auth file is not repository content either — the
|
||||||
|
# pipeline writes it on the VPS from the HTPASSWD_CONTENT secret; the local copy
|
||||||
|
# exists only so `docker compose` can mount it.
|
||||||
.env
|
.env
|
||||||
/secrets/
|
/secrets/
|
||||||
|
/deploy/htpasswd
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Generated code (spec-v5): src/types/content-ids.ts is produced by
|
# Generated code (spec-v5): src/types/content-ids.ts is produced by
|
||||||
# scripts/generate-content-types.ts from src/data/*.json on predev/prebuild/prepare.
|
# scripts/generate-content-types.ts from src/data/*.json on predev/prebuild/prepare.
|
||||||
|
|||||||
+1
-1
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Do not start coding based only on the user's description.
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
## 4. Conversation language
|
## 4. Conversation language
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**IMPORTANT:** All responses are in Vietnamese. Source code and docs are in English.
|
**IMPORTANT:** All responses are in English.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## 5. Don't run the headless browser to verify.
|
## 5. Don't run the headless browser to verify.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -144,13 +144,13 @@ src/
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
## Deployment
|
## Deployment
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- Site deployment is triggered automatically by the GitHub workflow `.github/workflows/deploy.yml` (push to `master`); infra redeployment by `.github/workflows/deploy-infra.yml` — triggered ONLY by changes to `nginx.conf` / `compose.yaml` / `deploy/htpasswd`, plus `workflow_dispatch` (the token-rotation runbook): test-before-touch (`nginx -t` in a throwaway container with placeholder values), then `docker compose up -d --force-recreate` + health probe (spec: `docs/design/specs/v4/spec-v4-deploy-infra.md` + `docs/design/specs/v6/spec-v6-github-actions.md`)
|
- Site deployment is triggered automatically by the GitHub workflow `.github/workflows/deploy.yml` (push to `master`); infra redeployment by `.github/workflows/deploy-infra.yml` — triggered ONLY by changes to `nginx.conf` / `compose.yaml`, plus `workflow_dispatch` (the token-rotation runbook: overwrite the `HTPASSWD_CONTENT` repository secret, then dispatch — the Basic-auth file is no longer a commit target, spec-v6 D16): test-before-touch (`nginx -t` in a throwaway container with placeholder values), then `docker compose up -d --force-recreate` + health probe (spec: `docs/design/specs/v4/spec-v4-deploy-infra.md` + `docs/design/specs/v6/spec-v6-github-actions.md`)
|
||||||
- The repository is GitHub-primary and **public**; `master` is unprotected on purpose (an edit-mode PUT must not be refused). `.gitea/workflows/` stays in the tree until the first green GitHub run is verified, then it is deleted and the Gitea repository is archived (spec-v6 D9)
|
- The repository is GitHub-primary and **public**; `master` is unprotected on purpose (an edit-mode PUT must not be refused). `.gitea/workflows/` stays in the tree until the first green GitHub run is verified, then it is deleted and the Gitea repository is archived (spec-v6 D9)
|
||||||
- Site identity is deployment-time configuration, not a repo literal: `SITE_URL` / `SITE_NAME` are GitHub **repository variables** (`vars.` context — public values, not secrets) passed as job env to `build` and `generate-resume`; locally they live in the uncommitted `.env` (template `.env.example`). A production build without them fails with an error naming the variable
|
- Site identity is deployment-time configuration, not a repo literal: `SITE_URL` / `SITE_NAME` are GitHub **repository variables** (`vars.` context — public values, not secrets) passed as job env to `build` and `generate-resume`; locally they live in the uncommitted `.env` (template `.env.example`). A production build without them fails with an error naming the variable
|
||||||
- The stack directory and the container name are deployment-time configuration as well: both workflows read the stack path from the repository variable `STACK_DIR` — absolute, **no trailing slash**, because the jobs append `/dist/`, `/` and `/deploy/` themselves — and the infra job reads the compose service / container name it recreates and probes from `CONTAINER_NAME`. Each job refuses a bad value in its first step, before any artifact download or rsync reaches the VPS, and the infra guard greps `compose.yaml` so `CONTAINER_NAME` cannot disagree with the service and `container_name` this repository declares (spec-v6 D15)
|
- The stack directory and the container name are deployment-time configuration as well: both workflows read the stack path from the repository variable `STACK_DIR` — absolute, **no trailing slash**, because the jobs append `/dist/` and `/` themselves — and the infra job reads the compose service / container name it recreates and probes from `CONTAINER_NAME`. Each job refuses a bad value in its first step, before any artifact download or rsync reaches the VPS, and the infra guard greps `compose.yaml` so `CONTAINER_NAME` cannot disagree with the service and `container_name` this repository declares (spec-v6 D15)
|
||||||
- Three jobs: `build` (`pnpm build` → `dist/` artifact) → `generate-resume` (`pnpm tsx scripts/generate-resume.ts --lang=en`, then `--lang=vi`) → `deploy` rsyncs `dist/`, both PDFs included, to `${{ vars.STACK_DIR }}/dist/`
|
- Three jobs: `build` (`pnpm build` → `dist/` artifact) → `generate-resume` (`pnpm tsx scripts/generate-resume.ts --lang=en`, then `--lang=vi`) → `deploy` rsyncs `dist/`, both PDFs included, to `${{ vars.STACK_DIR }}/dist/`
|
||||||
- `nginx.conf` — production Nginx SPA routing + caching config + the `/api/content/` location: auth_basic (`deploy/htpasswd`) in front of a proxied Contents API, proxied to it over HTTP/2 (`proxy_http_version 2` + a cleared `Connection` header, spec-v4 D14, verified against `api.github.com` 2026-10-26; the stack's nginx 1.31.x already caches upstream connections by default since 1.29.7, so no `upstream` block is declared, and the template carries only `${CONTENT_API_BASE}` and `Bearer ${CONTENT_API_TOKEN}` — the token and the git host never enter the SPA bundle or the repository). The image's envsubst step renders the template **before nginx parses it**, so `proxy_pass` is a literal upstream rather than an nginx variable — the reason the location-prefix → directive-URI mapping works and the reason a placeholder in `proxy_pass` must be a resolvable literal IP (spec-v6 D4a)
|
- `nginx.conf` — production Nginx SPA routing + caching config + the `/api/content/` location: auth_basic (`/etc/nginx/htpasswd` — the file is **not committed**: `deploy-infra.yml` writes it on the VPS from the `HTPASSWD_CONTENT` repository secret, spec-v6 D16) in front of a proxied Contents API, proxied to it over HTTP/2 (`proxy_http_version 2` + a cleared `Connection` header, spec-v4 D14, verified against `api.github.com` 2026-10-26; the stack's nginx 1.31.x already caches upstream connections by default since 1.29.7, so no `upstream` block is declared, and the template carries only `${CONTENT_API_BASE}` and `Bearer ${CONTENT_API_TOKEN}` — the token and the git host never enter the SPA bundle or the repository). The image's envsubst step renders the template **before nginx parses it**, so `proxy_pass` is a literal upstream rather than an nginx variable — the reason the location-prefix → directive-URI mapping works and the reason a placeholder in `proxy_pass` must be a resolvable literal IP (spec-v6 D4a)
|
||||||
- `compose.yaml` — the stack definition for local AND VPS use (repo copy == stack copy): runtime values live in `secrets/site_config` (gitignored file in the stack directory, two lines `CONTENT_API_TOKEN=` / `CONTENT_API_BASE=`, chmod 600), sourced by an entrypoint override (`set -a` + inline `nginx -g 'daemon off;'` — a compose entrypoint override drops the image's CMD) before the official entrypoint renders the template; the stack directory has no `.env`. On the VPS the same stack is managed by **Dockge** (upstream; stacks dir `/opt/stacks`, stack file `/opt/stacks/dong-site/compose.yaml`) — the repository is the single source of truth for `nginx.conf` / `compose.yaml` / `deploy/htpasswd`
|
- `compose.yaml` — the stack definition for local AND VPS use (repo copy == stack copy): runtime values live in `secrets/site_config` (gitignored file in the stack directory, two lines `CONTENT_API_TOKEN=` / `CONTENT_API_BASE=`, chmod 600), sourced by an entrypoint override (`set -a` + inline `nginx -g 'daemon off;'` — a compose entrypoint override drops the image's CMD) before the official entrypoint renders the template; the stack directory has no `.env`. On the VPS the same stack is managed by **Dockge** (upstream; stacks dir `/opt/stacks`, stack file `/opt/stacks/dong-site/compose.yaml`) — the repository is the single source of truth for `nginx.conf` / `compose.yaml`; `deploy/htpasswd` is the exception (spec-v6 D16): it is gitignored, lives only on the server (written by the infra job from the `HTPASSWD_CONTENT` secret) and as an untracked local copy for the local compose mount
|
||||||
- `compose.override.yaml` — local-only, auto-merged by `docker compose`, never rsynced by the pipeline: publishes the container on `127.0.0.1:8081` so the production stack can be browsed locally; the VPS stack is unaffected
|
- `compose.override.yaml` — local-only, auto-merged by `docker compose`, never rsynced by the pipeline: publishes the container on `127.0.0.1:8081` so the production stack can be browsed locally; the VPS stack is unaffected
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
```
|
```
|
||||||
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ All specification documents are in `docs/design/`:
|
|||||||
| `specs/v3/spec-v3-*.md` | v3 feature specs (theme colors, theme switch, theme palette switch, palette reference, UI enhancements, mobile navigation, nav & CTA enhancements, nav swatch & hamburger, typography, i18n, resume improvements, resume redesign, review fixes) |
|
| `specs/v3/spec-v3-*.md` | v3 feature specs (theme colors, theme switch, theme palette switch, palette reference, UI enhancements, mobile navigation, nav & CTA enhancements, nav swatch & hamburger, typography, i18n, resume improvements, resume redesign, review fixes) |
|
||||||
| `specs/v4/spec-v4-*.md` | v4 feature specs (i18n locale overlay, git-backed live edit with preview, authenticated Contents-API write path; supersedes v3-i18n Phase 2). `spec-v4-data-organization.md`: per-entity content files, per-page field-level manifests, per-feature-group UI — implemented 2026-10-23 (automated checks pass; browser walkthrough pending). `spec-v4-inline-editing.md`: edit everything on the page (pencil-icon triggers, tag chips, record add/delete/move, settings popover), JSON panel deleted — implemented 2026-10-23; it supersedes live-edit §5.1/§5.4 panel scope. `spec-v4-deploy-infra.md`: pipeline redeploy of the VPS nginx container, Dockge-managed stack (paths-filtered `deploy-infra.yml`, test-before-touch, repo-as-source-of-truth, token-safety rules) + externalizing site identity — `SITE_URL` / `SITE_NAME` as CI Actions variables, `GITEA_TOKEN` + `GITEA_CONTENTS_API` in the stack's single config file `secrets/site_config` — repo side implemented 2026-10-23 (`deploy-infra.yml`, `compose.yaml` secret + entrypoint override, env-driven identity); owner-side variables/config file + first verified run pending |
|
| `specs/v4/spec-v4-*.md` | v4 feature specs (i18n locale overlay, git-backed live edit with preview, authenticated Contents-API write path; supersedes v3-i18n Phase 2). `spec-v4-data-organization.md`: per-entity content files, per-page field-level manifests, per-feature-group UI — implemented 2026-10-23 (automated checks pass; browser walkthrough pending). `spec-v4-inline-editing.md`: edit everything on the page (pencil-icon triggers, tag chips, record add/delete/move, settings popover), JSON panel deleted — implemented 2026-10-23; it supersedes live-edit §5.1/§5.4 panel scope. `spec-v4-deploy-infra.md`: pipeline redeploy of the VPS nginx container, Dockge-managed stack (paths-filtered `deploy-infra.yml`, test-before-touch, repo-as-source-of-truth, token-safety rules) + externalizing site identity — `SITE_URL` / `SITE_NAME` as CI Actions variables, `GITEA_TOKEN` + `GITEA_CONTENTS_API` in the stack's single config file `secrets/site_config` — repo side implemented 2026-10-23 (`deploy-infra.yml`, `compose.yaml` secret + entrypoint override, env-driven identity); owner-side variables/config file + first verified run pending |
|
||||||
| `specs/v5/spec-v5-*.md` | v5 feature specs. `spec-v5-generated-content-ids.md`: the content id unions and the project category values are generated from the structure documents (`scripts/generate-content-types.ts`, run by `predev` / `prebuild` / `prepare`), edit mode writes JSON only, validator rule 7 requires a label for every used category in both languages — implemented 2026-10-24; it supersedes the id-union legs of `spec-v4-live-edit.md` §3.1 |
|
| `specs/v5/spec-v5-*.md` | v5 feature specs. `spec-v5-generated-content-ids.md`: the content id unions and the project category values are generated from the structure documents (`scripts/generate-content-types.ts`, run by `predev` / `prebuild` / `prepare`), edit mode writes JSON only, validator rule 7 requires a label for every used category in both languages — implemented 2026-10-24; it supersedes the id-union legs of `spec-v4-live-edit.md` §3.1 |
|
||||||
| `specs/v6/spec-v6-*.md` | v6 feature specs. `spec-v6-github-actions.md`: both pipelines move to GitHub Actions and the repository becomes GitHub-primary, the write-path values are renamed `CONTENT_API_TOKEN` / `CONTENT_API_BASE` with a `Bearer` upstream header, `draft.ts` learns GitHub's 409 conflict answer, the site keeps its VPS/nginx/Dockge host and its three-job pipeline — repo side implemented 2026-10-26 (owner-side GitHub variables/secrets, the VPS `secrets/site_config` rewrite and the first verified run are open); it supersedes the CI-host legs of `spec-v4-deploy-infra.md` and the Contents-API status codes of `spec-v4-live-edit.md` §6.1 |
|
|`specs/v6/spec-v6-*.md`|v6 feature specs. `spec-v6-github-actions.md`: both pipelines move to GitHub Actions and the repository becomes GitHub-primary, the write-path values are renamed `CONTENT_API_TOKEN` / `CONTENT_API_BASE` with a `Bearer` upstream header, `draft.ts` learns GitHub's 409 conflict answer, the site keeps its VPS/nginx/Dockge host and its three-job pipeline, and the Basic-auth file leaves the repository — `deploy/htpasswd` is gitignored, the infra job writes it on the VPS from the `HTPASSWD_CONTENT` repository secret (D16, 2026-10-28) — repo side implemented 2026-10-26 (owner-side GitHub variables/secrets, the VPS `secrets/site_config` rewrite and the first verified run are open); it supersedes the CI-host legs of `spec-v4-deploy-infra.md` and the Contents-API status codes of `spec-v4-live-edit.md` §6.1|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Read `spec.md` first for product context. Read `spec-v2.md` for current feature scope.
|
Read `spec.md` first for product context. Read `spec-v2.md` for current feature scope.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -78,11 +78,16 @@ mkdir -p secrets
|
|||||||
# CONTENT_API_TOKEN=<token>
|
# CONTENT_API_TOKEN=<token>
|
||||||
# CONTENT_API_BASE=https://api.github.com/repos/<owner>/<repo>/contents/
|
# CONTENT_API_BASE=https://api.github.com/repos/<owner>/<repo>/contents/
|
||||||
chmod 600 secrets/site_config
|
chmod 600 secrets/site_config
|
||||||
|
# deploy/htpasswd — the Basic-auth file is not committed (spec-v6 D16), but the
|
||||||
|
# compose mount needs it locally. Generate one line with any htpasswd tool
|
||||||
|
# (e.g. `docker run --rm httpd:2 htpasswd -nbB editor '<pass>'`) and save it:
|
||||||
|
mkdir -p deploy
|
||||||
|
docker run --rm httpd:2 htpasswd -nbB editor '<pass>' > deploy/htpasswd
|
||||||
docker network create docker-network # once; compose.yaml joins it
|
docker network create docker-network # once; compose.yaml joins it
|
||||||
docker compose up -d
|
docker compose up -d
|
||||||
```
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
`compose.yaml` defines no published port (the VPS container is reached through its own fronting); `compose.override.yaml` — auto-merged by `docker compose`, never shipped by the pipeline — publishes the container on the local loopback. Open **`http://127.0.0.1:8081/`** in a browser; `?edit` there asks for HTTP Basic credentials from `deploy/htpasswd`. If 8081 is taken on your machine, change the host port in `compose.override.yaml`. Stop the stack with `docker compose stop`.
|
`compose.yaml` defines no published port (the VPS container is reached through its own fronting); `compose.override.yaml` — auto-merged by `docker compose`, never shipped by the pipeline — publishes the container on the local loopback. Open **`http://127.0.0.1:8081/`** in a browser; `?edit` there asks for HTTP Basic credentials against the local `deploy/htpasswd` you just created (the production copy is written by the infra pipeline from the `HTPASSWD_CONTENT` secret). If 8081 is taken on your machine, change the host port in `compose.override.yaml`. Stop the stack with `docker compose stop`.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Production deployment (GitHub Actions)
|
## Production deployment (GitHub Actions)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -91,9 +96,9 @@ docker compose up -d
|
|||||||
| Workflow | Trigger | What it does |
|
| Workflow | Trigger | What it does |
|
||||||
|---|---|---|
|
|---|---|---|
|
||||||
| [`.github/workflows/deploy.yml`](.github/workflows/deploy.yml) | push to `master` | `build` (validate content → `pnpm build`) → `generate-resume` (EN + VI PDFs) → `deploy` rsyncs `dist/` (PDFs included) to `${STACK_DIR}/dist/` on the VPS |
|
| [`.github/workflows/deploy.yml`](.github/workflows/deploy.yml) | push to `master` | `build` (validate content → `pnpm build`) → `generate-resume` (EN + VI PDFs) → `deploy` rsyncs `dist/` (PDFs included) to `${STACK_DIR}/dist/` on the VPS |
|
||||||
| [`.github/workflows/deploy-infra.yml`](.github/workflows/deploy-infra.yml) | push to `master` touching `nginx.conf` / `compose.yaml` / `deploy/htpasswd`, or manual dispatch | rsyncs exactly those three files to the stack directory, tests the new config in a throwaway container (`nginx -t`), then `docker compose up -d --force-recreate` + health probe |
|
| [`.github/workflows/deploy-infra.yml`](.github/workflows/deploy-infra.yml) | push to `master` touching `nginx.conf` / `compose.yaml`, or manual dispatch | rsyncs exactly those two files to the stack directory, writes `deploy/htpasswd` there from the `HTPASSWD_CONTENT` repository secret, tests the new config in a throwaway container (`nginx -t`), then `docker compose up -d --force-recreate` + health probe |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Only `master` deploys. A content commit never restarts nginx; an infra commit never rebuilds the site. The VPS stack is managed by Dockge (`/opt/stacks/dong-site`); the repository is the single source of truth for the three infra files.
|
Only `master` deploys. A content commit never restarts nginx; an infra commit never rebuilds the site. The VPS stack is managed by Dockge (`/opt/stacks/dong-site`); the repository is the single source of truth for the two infra files — the Basic-auth file is the exception: it lives only on the server, written from the `HTPASSWD_CONTENT` secret (spec-v6 D16).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The repository is GitHub-primary and public; the pipelines run on GitHub-hosted runners (free for public repositories). `master` carries no branch protection on purpose: edit mode writes straight to it, and the validation step in `build` is what keeps a malformed content commit from deploying. `.gitea/workflows/` is kept only until the first green GitHub run is verified, then deleted (spec-v6 D9).
|
The repository is GitHub-primary and public; the pipelines run on GitHub-hosted runners (free for public repositories). `master` carries no branch protection on purpose: edit mode writes straight to it, and the validation step in `build` is what keeps a malformed content commit from deploying. `.gitea/workflows/` is kept only until the first green GitHub run is verified, then deleted (spec-v6 D9).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -143,10 +148,11 @@ Then create GitHub Actions **secrets** — Settings → Secrets and variables
|
|||||||
| `DEPLOY_SSH_PORT` | SSH port |
|
| `DEPLOY_SSH_PORT` | SSH port |
|
||||||
| `DEPLOY_USER` | `gitea-deployer` |
|
| `DEPLOY_USER` | `gitea-deployer` |
|
||||||
| `DEPLOY_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY` | the private key content |
|
| `DEPLOY_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY` | the private key content |
|
||||||
|
| `HTPASSWD_CONTENT` | the one htpasswd line — output of `htpasswd -nbB <user> '<pass>'` (user + bcrypt hash). The infra job writes it to `${STACK_DIR}/deploy/htpasswd` (chmod 600); the credential never appears in the repository (spec-v6 D16) |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**3. VPS stack config** — in the stack directory `/opt/stacks/dong-site/`, create `secrets/site_config` (chmod 600, exactly the two `KEY=value` lines shown in step 5 above). The token should be a dedicated GitHub **fine-grained PAT** (`site-contents-write`: this repository only, `Contents: Read and write`, with an expiry). The pipeline never rsyncs `secrets/`, so it can never touch this file; it never appears in `docker inspect` or the Dockge env tab.
|
**3. VPS stack config** — in the stack directory `/opt/stacks/dong-site/`, create `secrets/site_config` (chmod 600, exactly the two `KEY=value` lines shown in step 5 above). The token should be a dedicated GitHub **fine-grained PAT** (`site-contents-write`: this repository only, `Contents: Read and write`, with an expiry). The pipeline never rsyncs `secrets/`, so it can never touch this file; it never appears in `docker inspect` or the Dockge env tab.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**4. Edit-mode login** — production `/api/content/` sits behind HTTP Basic (`auth_basic` + `deploy/htpasswd`, committed as hashes). The browser prompts once per session.
|
**4. Edit-mode login** — production `/api/content/` sits behind HTTP Basic (`auth_basic` + the htpasswd file the infra pipeline writes from the `HTPASSWD_CONTENT` secret — the hash is no longer in the public repository). The browser prompts once per session. Rotating the editor password: regenerate the line (`htpasswd -nbB <user> '<new-pass>'`), overwrite the secret, run `deploy-infra` via `workflow_dispatch` — no commit involved.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Editing content in production
|
### Editing content in production
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
|
|||||||
# Local-only compose override (compose spec: `docker compose` auto-merges this
|
# Local-only compose override (compose spec: `docker compose` auto-merges this
|
||||||
# file on top of compose.yaml). The deploy-infra pipeline rsyncs exactly
|
# file on top of compose.yaml). The deploy-infra pipeline rsyncs exactly
|
||||||
# nginx.conf / compose.yaml / deploy/htpasswd — never this file — so the VPS
|
# nginx.conf / compose.yaml (and writes the Basic-auth file from the
|
||||||
|
# HTPASSWD_CONTENT secret) — never this file — so the VPS
|
||||||
# stack is unaffected. It publishes the container on the local loopback so the
|
# stack is unaffected. It publishes the container on the local loopback so the
|
||||||
# site is reachable from a browser for testing the real serving path.
|
# site is reachable from a browser for testing the real serving path.
|
||||||
services:
|
services:
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
editor:$6$r8s2CI52cy1CMFfV$QeLOi/VWtifP.05NLZlUdbb5GP.FahiHBKYD4LKgOZGXLmEMWq1ODfTrLfpheCt0Rvwctp43h.SyirYFj23ll0
|
|
||||||
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
Status: **Design agreed 2026-10-23 (rev.8); repo side implemented 2026-10-23; owner-side setup + first verified run TODO.** Closes the manual half of `spec-v4-live-edit.md` §12 row 11 (the infra files ship with a dedicated pipeline), and per the owner's direction of 2026-10-23 removes explicit site identity (`cv.vugado.com`, `code.vugado.com`, repo path, site name) from the repository — those values become deployment-time configuration (D10–D12). Rev.2 added the Dockge reality (D7, D8); rev.3 recorded the owner's confirmed facts (`DOCKGE_STACKS_DIR=/opt/stacks`, upstream Dockge, `compose.yaml` naming) and the matching repository rename (D9, done); rev.4 added the site-identity externalization design (D10–D12); rev.5 moved `GITEA_TOKEN` off the stack `.env` to a Docker secret file after the owner verified file-based secrets work on the VPS's `docker compose` (non-swarm); rev.6 removes the stack `.env` entirely (owner: "don't use .env") — both server-side values live in ONE file, `secrets/site_config` (D13); rev.7 switches the site-identity channel from Gitea Actions secrets to Actions variables (`vars.` context — public values; owner direction 2026-10-23, `deploy.yml` job env updated); rev.8 records the first-run fixes proven by the 2026-10-23 runs and a local reproduction of the test step: three single-path rsync steps, `-R` dropped (the action prefixes `$GITHUB_WORKSPACE`), `NGINX_ENVSUBST_FILTER` as a `|`-regex (a comma form matches nothing), and a resolvable test placeholder (`http://127.0.0.1:1`) — the reproduced test step passes. Implementation landed the same day: `deploy-infra.yml`, the §4.1 `compose.yaml`, `site.ts` env read, the vite site-identity plugin + env-driven dev proxy, generated `robots.txt`, `deploy.yml` job env, `.env.example`, AGENTS.md — see §8 for what remains owner-side.
|
Status: **Design agreed 2026-10-23 (rev.8); repo side implemented 2026-10-23; owner-side setup + first verified run TODO.** Closes the manual half of `spec-v4-live-edit.md` §12 row 11 (the infra files ship with a dedicated pipeline), and per the owner's direction of 2026-10-23 removes explicit site identity (`cv.vugado.com`, `code.vugado.com`, repo path, site name) from the repository — those values become deployment-time configuration (D10–D12). Rev.2 added the Dockge reality (D7, D8); rev.3 recorded the owner's confirmed facts (`DOCKGE_STACKS_DIR=/opt/stacks`, upstream Dockge, `compose.yaml` naming) and the matching repository rename (D9, done); rev.4 added the site-identity externalization design (D10–D12); rev.5 moved `GITEA_TOKEN` off the stack `.env` to a Docker secret file after the owner verified file-based secrets work on the VPS's `docker compose` (non-swarm); rev.6 removes the stack `.env` entirely (owner: "don't use .env") — both server-side values live in ONE file, `secrets/site_config` (D13); rev.7 switches the site-identity channel from Gitea Actions secrets to Actions variables (`vars.` context — public values; owner direction 2026-10-23, `deploy.yml` job env updated); rev.8 records the first-run fixes proven by the 2026-10-23 runs and a local reproduction of the test step: three single-path rsync steps, `-R` dropped (the action prefixes `$GITHUB_WORKSPACE`), `NGINX_ENVSUBST_FILTER` as a `|`-regex (a comma form matches nothing), and a resolvable test placeholder (`http://127.0.0.1:1`) — the reproduced test step passes. Implementation landed the same day: `deploy-infra.yml`, the §4.1 `compose.yaml`, `site.ts` env read, the vite site-identity plugin + env-driven dev proxy, generated `robots.txt`, `deploy.yml` job env, `.env.example`, AGENTS.md — see §8 for what remains owner-side.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
> **Superseded in part on 2026-10-26 by `specs/v6/spec-v6-github-actions.md`:** the CI host is GitHub Actions, `SITE_URL` / `SITE_NAME` are GitHub repository variables, and the write-path values are `CONTENT_API_TOKEN` / `CONTENT_API_BASE` — the `GITEA_*` names throughout this document are what was in force when it was written (rev.7's channel decision, variables not secrets, carries over unchanged; only the host changes). D1–D4, D6–D9, D11–D13, the token-safety rules of §5 and the Dockge-safety argument stand as written; D14's HTTP/2 upstream was re-verified against `api.github.com` and stands.
|
> **Superseded in part on 2026-10-26 by `specs/v6/spec-v6-github-actions.md`:** the CI host is GitHub Actions, `SITE_URL` / `SITE_NAME` are GitHub repository variables, and the write-path values are `CONTENT_API_TOKEN` / `CONTENT_API_BASE` — the `GITEA_*` names throughout this document are what was in force when it was written (rev.7's channel decision, variables not secrets, carries over unchanged; only the host changes). D1–D4, D6–D9, D11–D13, the token-safety rules of §5 and the Dockge-safety argument stand as written; D14's HTTP/2 upstream was re-verified against `api.github.com` and stands. **Further superseded 2026-10-28 (v6 rev.2 D16):** D1's `paths:` filter no longer includes `deploy/htpasswd` — the file is gitignored and written on the server by the infra job from the `HTPASSWD_CONTENT` repository secret; the rest of D1 (separate workflow, narrow triggers, `workflow_dispatch` as the rotation runbook) stands.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## 1. Current state
|
## 1. Current state
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||||||
# Spec v6 — GitHub Actions
|
# Spec v6 — GitHub Actions
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
> **Parent:** `specs/v4/spec-v4-deploy-infra.md` (the pipeline design this one keeps), `specs/v4/spec-v4-live-edit.md` (the write path this one re-targets)
|
> **Parent:** `specs/v4/spec-v4-deploy-infra.md` (the pipeline design this one keeps), `specs/v4/spec-v4-live-edit.md` (the write path this one re-targets)
|
||||||
> **Status:** rev.1 — repo side implemented 2026-10-26 (§7), automated checks pass (§8); the owner-side setup and the first verified run are open (§6).
|
> **Status:** rev.1 — repo side implemented 2026-10-26 (§7), automated checks pass (§8); the owner-side setup and the first verified run are open (§6). rev.2 2026-10-28 — D16: the Basic-auth file leaves the repository (§7.1); repo side implemented, owner-side secret creation open (§6).
|
||||||
> **Supersedes:** the CI-host legs of `spec-v4-deploy-infra.md` — the `vars.` env surface (§3 "Env surface"), D5's "not added to Gitea Actions secrets", D14's Gitea-only host claim — and the Contents-API status codes recorded in `spec-v4-live-edit.md` §6.1. Everything else in those specs (D1–D4, D6–D9, D11–D13, the token-safety rules, the Dockge-safety argument) stands unchanged.
|
> **Supersedes:** the CI-host legs of `spec-v4-deploy-infra.md` — the `vars.` env surface (§3 "Env surface"), D5's "not added to Gitea Actions secrets", D14's Gitea-only host claim — and the Contents-API status codes recorded in `spec-v4-live-edit.md` §6.1. Everything else in those specs (D1–D4, D6–D9, D11–D13, the token-safety rules, the Dockge-safety argument) stands unchanged.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ What does change is one thing the pipeline was never separate from: the reposito
|
|||||||
| D8 | GitHub-hosted runners, **public** repository. | GitHub Actions usage is free for public repositories on standard runners and free for self-hosted runners; a private repository would bill minutes against a monthly quota for a pipeline that installs pnpm twice and renders two PDFs. Accepted consequence: the content JSON and the commit history are public. |
|
| D8 | GitHub-hosted runners, **public** repository. | GitHub Actions usage is free for public repositories on standard runners and free for self-hosted runners; a private repository would bill minutes against a monthly quota for a pipeline that installs pnpm twice and renders two PDFs. Accepted consequence: the content JSON and the commit history are public. |
|
||||||
| D9 | `.gitea/workflows/` is kept until the first GitHub run is verified, then deleted. | Owner's call: see the pipelines run green on GitHub before cutting the old ones. This is a scheduled deletion recorded as an open item (§8), not a compatibility shim — nothing reads them once GitHub is the primary. |
|
| D9 | `.gitea/workflows/` is kept until the first GitHub run is verified, then deleted. | Owner's call: see the pipelines run green on GitHub before cutting the old ones. This is a scheduled deletion recorded as an open item (§8), not a compatibility shim — nothing reads them once GitHub is the primary. |
|
||||||
| D15 | The two server-side layout values the workflows hard-coded — the stack directory (5 call sites) and the service/container name `dong-site` (4 call sites) — become the **repository variables** `STACK_DIR` and `CONTAINER_NAME`; the job that uses each refuses a bad value in its first step. | Both describe the server's deployment layout, not repository content — the same class of value as `SITE_URL`: public, therefore a variable and not a secret. As literals they made a stack rename a multi-file YAML edit plus a docs sweep, and a typo would have rsynced `dist/` into the wrong directory or probed the wrong container. `CONTAINER_NAME` is checked against `compose.yaml` in the same step, because that one string is used twice over — as a compose service argument and as the `docker exec` / `docker logs` target — while the file declaring both lives in this repository. Guarding it first means a bad value fails the way the site-identity check fails: at once, naming the variable and where to set it. Recorded sequence: the owner asked for the path first and the name in the same session, so the name moved too rather than staying a literal. |
|
| D15 | The two server-side layout values the workflows hard-coded — the stack directory (5 call sites) and the service/container name `dong-site` (4 call sites) — become the **repository variables** `STACK_DIR` and `CONTAINER_NAME`; the job that uses each refuses a bad value in its first step. | Both describe the server's deployment layout, not repository content — the same class of value as `SITE_URL`: public, therefore a variable and not a secret. As literals they made a stack rename a multi-file YAML edit plus a docs sweep, and a typo would have rsynced `dist/` into the wrong directory or probed the wrong container. `CONTAINER_NAME` is checked against `compose.yaml` in the same step, because that one string is used twice over — as a compose service argument and as the `docker exec` / `docker logs` target — while the file declaring both lives in this repository. Guarding it first means a bad value fails the way the site-identity check fails: at once, naming the variable and where to set it. Recorded sequence: the owner asked for the path first and the name in the same session, so the name moved too rather than staying a literal. |
|
||||||
|
| D16 | **2026-10-28 (rev.2):** the Basic-auth file leaves the repository. `deploy/htpasswd` is untracked and gitignored; `deploy-infra.yml` writes it into the stack directory (`chmod 600`) from the **repository secret** `HTPASSWD_CONTENT`, before the test step; the file's `paths:` trigger is dropped. Credential rotation is: regenerate the line (`htpasswd -nbB`), overwrite the secret, `workflow_dispatch` — no commit. | The repository is public (D8), and the htpasswd line is a user name plus a bcrypt hash — offline-bruteforceable from any clone, forever. A hash is not the plaintext, but it does not have to live in the public archive either; the file has exactly two consumers (the production container's `auth_basic_user_file` mount and the throwaway test container's mount), both reading it from the stack directory, which the job now guarantees before testing. The containment mirrors the write token's rules (§4): one home, never in the repository, never in the bundle. The value is inlined into a **single-quoted** shell literal in the ssh script: bcrypt's `$2y$…` must not reach the remote shell unquoted, and appleboy's `envs:` mechanism exports values unquoted — so `envs:` is not used; the htpasswd character set (user name + bcrypt base64) carries no single quote, which makes the quoting exact. The empty-secret case fails the step with a named error rather than writing an empty file nginx would accept. |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## 3. Facts verified during the review (method recorded)
|
## 3. Facts verified during the review (method recorded)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -52,9 +53,10 @@ What does change is one thing the pipeline was never separate from: the reposito
|
|||||||
| Value | Home | Consumers |
|
| Value | Home | Consumers |
|
||||||
|---|---|---|
|
|---|---|---|
|
||||||
| `SITE_URL`, `SITE_NAME` | GitHub **repository variables** (`vars.`), passed as job env to `build` and `generate-resume` | the vite site-identity plugin, `src/data/site.ts`, `generate-sitemap.ts`, `generate-resume.ts` |
|
| `SITE_URL`, `SITE_NAME` | GitHub **repository variables** (`vars.`), passed as job env to `build` and `generate-resume` | the vite site-identity plugin, `src/data/site.ts`, `generate-sitemap.ts`, `generate-resume.ts` |
|
||||||
| `STACK_DIR` | GitHub **repository variables** (`vars.`) — the absolute stack directory as the deploy user sees it, **no trailing slash** | the `deploy` job's `remote_path`, the infra job's three `remote_path`s and both `appleboy/ssh-action` scripts; the guard step in each job |
|
| `STACK_DIR` | GitHub **repository variables** (`vars.`) — the absolute stack directory as the deploy user sees it, **no trailing slash** | the `deploy` job's `remote_path`, the infra job's two `remote_path`s and its three `appleboy/ssh-action` scripts; the guard step in each job |
|
||||||
| `CONTAINER_NAME` | GitHub **repository variables** (`vars.`) — the compose service name and the container name, which `compose.yaml` declares as one and the same | the infra job's `docker compose up -d --force-recreate`, `docker exec` ×2 and `docker logs`; the guard step, which greps `compose.yaml` for both declarations |
|
| `CONTAINER_NAME` | GitHub **repository variables** (`vars.`) — the compose service name and the container name, which `compose.yaml` declares as one and the same | the infra job's `docker compose up -d --force-recreate`, `docker exec` ×2 and `docker logs`; the guard step, which greps `compose.yaml` for both declarations |
|
||||||
| `DEPLOY_HOST`, `DEPLOY_SSH_PORT`, `DEPLOY_USER`, `DEPLOY_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY` | GitHub **secrets** | the rsync step, both `appleboy/ssh-action` steps |
|
| `DEPLOY_HOST`, `DEPLOY_SSH_PORT`, `DEPLOY_USER`, `DEPLOY_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY` | GitHub **secrets** | the rsync steps, the `appleboy/ssh-action` steps |
|
||||||
|
| `HTPASSWD_CONTENT` | GitHub **secret** (D16) — the one htpasswd line, user + bcrypt hash | the infra job's "Write deploy/htpasswd from the secret" step, which writes `${STACK_DIR}/deploy/htpasswd` (chmod 600) before the test container mounts it; the nginx container then serves it as `auth_basic_user_file`. Locally: an untracked `deploy/htpasswd` copy, needed by the compose mount |
|
||||||
| `CONTENT_API_TOKEN`, `CONTENT_API_BASE` | the stack's single config file `secrets/site_config` (chmod 600, server-side, never committed, never in CI) | the nginx container's envsubst template step; locally the uncommitted `.env`, read by `vite.config.ts` |
|
| `CONTENT_API_TOKEN`, `CONTENT_API_BASE` | the stack's single config file `secrets/site_config` (chmod 600, server-side, never committed, never in CI) | the nginx container's envsubst template step; locally the uncommitted `.env`, read by `vite.config.ts` |
|
||||||
| `NGINX_ENVSUBST_FILTER=CONTENT_API_TOKEN\|CONTENT_API_BASE` | `compose.yaml` | the official entrypoint's template renderer (a regex over variable **names**; alternatives separated with `\|`) |
|
| `NGINX_ENVSUBST_FILTER=CONTENT_API_TOKEN\|CONTENT_API_BASE` | `compose.yaml` | the official entrypoint's template renderer (a regex over variable **names**; alternatives separated with `\|`) |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -62,7 +64,7 @@ The token's rules are unchanged from `spec-v4-deploy-infra.md` §5: single home,
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
`CONTENT_API_BASE` is the full Contents-API base including the repository path — for this repository: `https://api.github.com/repos/dong-nz/cv/contents/`.
|
`CONTENT_API_BASE` is the full Contents-API base including the repository path — for this repository: `https://api.github.com/repos/dong-nz/cv/contents/`.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
`STACK_DIR` carries no trailing slash because the workflows append `/dist/`, `/` and `/deploy/` themselves; the guard rejects a trailing slash so a doubled one cannot reach rsync. `CONTAINER_NAME` is the single string `compose.yaml` declares twice — the service key `dong-site:` and `container_name: dong-site` — and the infra job uses it in both roles (`docker compose up -d --force-recreate <name>`, then `docker exec` / `docker logs <name>`), so the guard greps the checked-out `compose.yaml` and refuses a value matching neither. A stack rename is then: change `compose.yaml` in a commit, change the two variables — and the pipeline names the disagreement if the two are out of step.
|
`STACK_DIR` carries no trailing slash because the workflows append `/dist/` and `/` themselves (D16 removed the third append: the auth file is written by the job, not rsynced); the guard rejects a trailing slash so a doubled one cannot reach rsync. `CONTAINER_NAME` is the single string `compose.yaml` declares twice — the service key `dong-site:` and `container_name: dong-site` — and the infra job uses it in both roles (`docker compose up -d --force-recreate <name>`, then `docker exec` / `docker logs <name>`), so the guard greps the checked-out `compose.yaml` and refuses a value matching neither. A stack rename is then: change `compose.yaml` in a commit, change the two variables — and the pipeline names the disagreement if the two are out of step.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## 5. Migration runbook — the order is part of the design
|
## 5. Migration runbook — the order is part of the design
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -70,7 +72,7 @@ The token's rules are unchanged from `spec-v4-deploy-infra.md` §5: single home,
|
|||||||
2. Create the GitHub variables and secrets (§4), and the fine-grained write token.
|
2. Create the GitHub variables and secrets (§4), and the fine-grained write token.
|
||||||
3. **Update `/opt/stacks/dong-site/secrets/site_config` on the VPS first** — both new names with the GitHub values. This must precede step 4: the migration commit touches `nginx.conf` and `compose.yaml`, so the infra workflow runs in the same push, and `--force-recreate` (D4 of the infra spec) restarts the container with the config the file just supplied. A config file still carrying the old names renders `${CONTENT_API_BASE}` unsubstituted, nginx fails to start, the health probe fails, and the site is down until the file is fixed. Nothing else in the sequence has that property.
|
3. **Update `/opt/stacks/dong-site/secrets/site_config` on the VPS first** — both new names with the GitHub values. This must precede step 4: the migration commit touches `nginx.conf` and `compose.yaml`, so the infra workflow runs in the same push, and `--force-recreate` (D4 of the infra spec) restarts the container with the config the file just supplied. A config file still carrying the old names renders `${CONTENT_API_BASE}` unsubstituted, nginx fails to start, the health probe fails, and the site is down until the file is fixed. Nothing else in the sequence has that property.
|
||||||
4. Merge the migration commit → `build` + `generate-resume` + `deploy` run on GitHub. The live site is untouched by this step: `deploy.yml` rsyncs `dist/` only.
|
4. Merge the migration commit → `build` + `generate-resume` + `deploy` run on GitHub. The live site is untouched by this step: `deploy.yml` rsyncs `dist/` only.
|
||||||
5. `deploy-infra.yml` runs in the same push (or by `workflow_dispatch`): rsync the three infra files → `nginx -t` in a throwaway container with placeholders → recreate → health probe.
|
5. `deploy-infra.yml` runs in the same push (or by `workflow_dispatch`): rsync the two infra files, write `deploy/htpasswd` from the `HTPASSWD_CONTENT` secret (D16) → `nginx -t` in a throwaway container with placeholders → recreate → health probe.
|
||||||
6. Smoke the write path: `curl` GET and PUT through `/api/content/` with the Basic credentials, confirm the commit lands on GitHub and the pipeline deploys it; then one real save from `?edit`.
|
6. Smoke the write path: `curl` GET and PUT through `/api/content/` with the Basic credentials, confirm the commit lands on GitHub and the pipeline deploys it; then one real save from `?edit`.
|
||||||
7. Verify a conflict once: two saves against the same document, or an out-of-band commit to `master` between a read and a save. The second must report a conflict with a rebase offer, not a failure.
|
7. Verify a conflict once: two saves against the same document, or an out-of-band commit to `master` between a read and a save. The second must report a conflict with a rebase offer, not a failure.
|
||||||
8. Delete `.gitea/workflows/` (D9) and archive the Gitea repository.
|
8. Delete `.gitea/workflows/` (D9) and archive the Gitea repository.
|
||||||
@@ -85,6 +87,7 @@ The token's rules are unchanged from `spec-v4-deploy-infra.md` §5: single home,
|
|||||||
- [ ] Push the tag: `git push github v0.0.1` — the mirror carried branches but no tags.
|
- [ ] Push the tag: `git push github v0.0.1` — the mirror carried branches but no tags.
|
||||||
- [ ] Repository variables `SITE_URL`, `SITE_NAME`; secrets `DEPLOY_HOST`, `DEPLOY_SSH_PORT`, `DEPLOY_USER`, `DEPLOY_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY`. Without the variables `build` fails at the identity check; without the secrets the rsync and recreate steps fail while the infra test-before-touch step still passes.
|
- [ ] Repository variables `SITE_URL`, `SITE_NAME`; secrets `DEPLOY_HOST`, `DEPLOY_SSH_PORT`, `DEPLOY_USER`, `DEPLOY_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY`. Without the variables `build` fails at the identity check; without the secrets the rsync and recreate steps fail while the infra test-before-touch step still passes.
|
||||||
- [ ] Repository variables `STACK_DIR` (absolute stack directory, `/opt/stacks/dong-site`, no trailing slash) and `CONTAINER_NAME` (`dong-site`, matching `compose.yaml`). Both jobs stop at their first step without them.
|
- [ ] Repository variables `STACK_DIR` (absolute stack directory, `/opt/stacks/dong-site`, no trailing slash) and `CONTAINER_NAME` (`dong-site`, matching `compose.yaml`). Both jobs stop at their first step without them.
|
||||||
|
- [ ] GitHub secret `HTPASSWD_CONTENT` (D16, 2026-10-28): the current `deploy/htpasswd` line, verbatim. Without it `deploy-infra.yml` fails at the write step with a named error; the VPS copy written by the 2026-10-23 runs keeps serving until then. While `.gitea/workflows/` still exists (D9), Gitea must carry the same secret **plus the `STACK_DIR` / `CONTAINER_NAME` variables** (§7.1 parity, 2026-10-28): without them the Gitea mirror's guard steps refuse the run. After both hosts have the secret, the public repository no longer carries the bcrypt hash; old clones/commits still do — rotate the editor password if that matters.
|
||||||
- [ ] VPS accepts SSH from GitHub-hosted runners (the old runner may have reached the host from the same machine or LAN; GitHub runners come from GitHub's published IP ranges).
|
- [ ] VPS accepts SSH from GitHub-hosted runners (the old runner may have reached the host from the same machine or LAN; GitHub runners come from GitHub's published IP ranges).
|
||||||
- [ ] First `deploy.yml` and `deploy-infra.yml` runs observed green; §5 steps 6–7 verified.
|
- [ ] First `deploy.yml` and `deploy-infra.yml` runs observed green; §5 steps 6–7 verified.
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- [x] Local config renamed (untracked files, done 2026-10-26): `.env` carries `SITE_URL`, `SITE_NAME`, `CONTENT_API_BASE` with the GitHub base, token still supplied as a shell variable; `secrets/site_config` carries the two new names with the token left empty. With the old names in either file the local stack cannot render nginx (`${CONTENT_API_BASE}` stays unsubstituted) and `pnpm dev` builds no `/api/content/` proxy.
|
- [x] Local config renamed (untracked files, done 2026-10-26): `.env` carries `SITE_URL`, `SITE_NAME`, `CONTENT_API_BASE` with the GitHub base, token still supplied as a shell variable; `secrets/site_config` carries the two new names with the token left empty. With the old names in either file the local stack cannot render nginx (`${CONTENT_API_BASE}` stays unsubstituted) and `pnpm dev` builds no `/api/content/` proxy.
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@@ -105,7 +108,21 @@ The token's rules are unchanged from `spec-v4-deploy-infra.md` §5: single home,
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| `src/data/site.ts` | doc comment: repository variables, not Gitea Actions variables |
|
| `src/data/site.ts` | doc comment: repository variables, not Gitea Actions variables |
|
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| `AGENTS.md`, `README.md` | CI host, env names, GitHub variables/secrets setup |
|
| `AGENTS.md`, `README.md` | CI host, env names, GitHub variables/secrets setup |
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| `specs/v4/spec-v4-deploy-infra.md`, `specs/v4/spec-v4-live-edit.md` | supersession notes pointing here; the v2 and v5 specs are completion records and are left as written |
|
| `specs/v4/spec-v4-deploy-infra.md`, `specs/v4/spec-v4-live-edit.md` | supersession notes pointing here; the v2 and v5 specs are completion records and are left as written |
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| `.gitea/workflows/*` | kept until the first green GitHub run (D9). `deploy-infra.yml`'s test step now carries the `CONTENT_API_*` names, because the template it validates is the one this repository ships; its stack path stays a literal — no `STACK_DIR` is created on Gitea for files that are scheduled for deletion |
|
| `.gitea/workflows/*` | kept until the first green GitHub run (D9). `deploy-infra.yml`'s test step now carries the `CONTENT_API_*` names, because the template it validates is the one this repository ships. (Rev.1 note "its stack path stays a literal" is superseded by §7.1: the mirrors were brought to full parity with the GitHub workflows on 2026-10-28) |
|
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|
|
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|
### 7.1 rev.2 (2026-10-28) — D16: the Basic-auth file leaves the repository
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|
|
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|
| File | Change |
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||||||
|
|---|---|
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|
| `deploy/htpasswd` | `git rm --cached` — untracked, still on disk locally (the local compose mount needs it); its content moves to the `HTPASSWD_CONTENT` secret |
|
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|
| `.gitignore` | `+ /deploy/htpasswd`, in the deployment/runtime-config block beside `.env` and `secrets/` |
|
||||||
|
| `.github/workflows/deploy-infra.yml` | `paths:` drops `deploy/htpasswd`; the "Sync deploy/htpasswd" rsync step is replaced by "Write deploy/htpasswd from the secret" (appleboy/ssh-action: `mkdir -p deploy`, single-quoted secret literal → `printf` → `chmod 600`, empty secret refused with a named error), placed before the test step whose container mounts the file |
|
||||||
|
| `.gitea/workflows/deploy-infra.yml` | same D16 change as the GitHub file |
|
||||||
|
| `.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml` + `.gitea/workflows/deploy-infra.yml` | **full parity with the GitHub workflows (owner decision 2026-10-28):** `permissions: contents: read` on every job; the "Check stack directory" / "Check stack variables" guard steps added; the literals `/opt/stacks/dong-site` (9 call sites) and `dong-site` (4) replaced by `${{ vars.STACK_DIR }}` / `${{ vars.CONTAINER_NAME }}`. The only intentional differences left: the header comments naming the mirror, and the guard error text pointing at Gitea's settings path (Settings → Actions → Secrets and Variables → Variables). Owner-side consequence: Gitea must now carry `STACK_DIR`, `CONTAINER_NAME` (variables) and `HTPASSWD_CONTENT` (secret) exactly like GitHub, or the guard steps refuse the run — that was previously avoided by the literals (§7's rev.1 note, superseded) |
|
||||||
|
| `compose.yaml`, `nginx.conf` | untouched — the mount and `auth_basic_user_file` names are unchanged; only the file's origin moved |
|
||||||
|
| `AGENTS.md`, `README.md`, `compose.override.yaml` (comment) | trigger list, source-of-truth wording, the secrets table row, and the local-stack step that creates `deploy/htpasswd` |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Repo-side verification 2026-10-28: YAML of both workflows parses; the write step's shell contract was exercised locally (a sample `user:$2y$…` line through the exact single-quoted `printf` form round-trips byte-identical, and a line containing `$` survives the remote shell unexpanded); `git status` shows `deploy/htpasswd` staged as removed while the file stays on disk. Owner-side: create the secret (§6), then the next infra run proves the write → test → recreate chain.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## 8. Accepted risks
|
## 8. Accepted risks
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user